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The principles of self-determination and individual well-being support the use of voluntary
euthanasia by those who do not have moral or professional objections to it. Opponents of this
posture cite the ethical wrongness of the act itself and the folly of any public or legal policy
permitting euthanasia. Positive consequences ofmaking euthanasia legally permissible respect
the autonomy of competent patients desiring it, expand the population of patients who can
choose the option, and release the dyingpatient from otherwise prolonged suffering and agony.
Potentially bad consequences of permitting euthanasia include the undermining of the "moral
center" of medicine by allowing physicians to kill, the weakening of society's commitment to
provide optimal care for dying patients, and, of greatest concern, the "slippery slope"
argument.
The evaluation of the arguments leads to support for euthanasia, with its performance not
incompatiblewith a physician's professional commitment.
There is an emerging consensus that competent patients, or the surrogates of
incompetent patients, should be permitted to weigh the benefits and burdens of
alternative life-sustaining treatments according to the patient's values, and either to
refuse any treatment or to select from among available alternative treatments. More
recently, significant public and professional attention has shifted from life-sustaining
treatment to euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Unfortunately, some of the
most widely publicized cases, such as those of Dr. Kevorkian, have been sufficiently
problematic that even most supporters of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide
did not defend the physicians' actions in them. As a result, the subsequent debate
they spawned has often shed more heat than light on the subject. My aim here is to
formulate and evaluate some of the central ethical arguments for and against
euthanasia. Although my evaluation ofthe arguments leads me, with reservations, to
support permitting euthanasia, my primary aim is to identify confusions in some
common arguments, and problematic assumptions and claims that need more
defense or data in others. My hope is to advance the debate byfocusing attention on
what I believe should be the real issues therein.
In the recent bioethics literature, some have endorsed physician-assisted suicide
but not euthanasia [1]. Are the two sufficiently different that the moral arguments
that apply to one often do not apply to the other? A paradigm case of the former is
the provision by aphysician ofa lethal dose ofmedication to a patientwho asks for it
to end his or her life, and who then does so. A paradigm case of euthanasia is a
physician him- or herself administering the lethal dose, often when the patient is
unable to do so. The only difference that need exist between the two is who actually
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administers the lethal dose-the physician or the patient. In each instance, the
physician plays an active and necessary causal role in providing the lethal dose.
In physician-assisted suicide, the patient acts "last"-for example, in the way
Janet Adkins herself pushed the button after Dr. Kevorkian hooked her up to his
suicide machine, whereas, in euthanasia, the physician acts "last" by performing the
physical equivalent of pushing the button. In both, however, the choice rests fully
with the patient. In both, the patient acts "last" in the sense ofretaining the right to
change his or her mind until the point at which the lethal process becomes
irreversible. How could there be a substantial moral difference between them, based
only on this small difference in the part played by the physician in the causal process
resulting in death? Of course, it might be held that the moral difference is obvi-
ous-in euthanasia, the physician kills the patient, whereas, in physician-assisted
suicide, the patient kills him- or herself. But this argument is misleading at best. In
physician-assisted suicide, the physician and patient together kill the patient, a case
ofjoint action for which both are responsible. I shall take the arguments evaluated
belowto applyboth to physician-assisted suicide and to euthanasia and shallfocus on
euthanasia.
My concern here will be with voluntary euthanasia only; that is, with the case in
which a clearly competent patient makes a fullyvoluntary and persistent request for
euthanasia. A last introductory point is that I will examine only secular arguments
about euthanasia, though of course many people's attitudes to euthanasia are
inextricable from their religious views. I take this secular focus to be appropriate for
public policy.
THE CENTRAL ETHICAL ARGUMENT FOR VOLUNTARY ACTIVE
EUTHANASIA
The central ethical argument for euthanasia is familiar: that the very same two
fundamental ethical values that support the consensus on patients' rights to decide
about life-sustaining treatment also support the ethical permissibility of euthanasia.
These values are individual self-determination or autonomy and individual well-
being. By self-determination, as it bears on euthanasia, I mean people's interest in
making important decisions about their lives for themselves, according to their own
values or conceptions of a good life, and in being left free to act on those decisions.
Respecting self-determination permits people to form and to live in accordance with
their own conception ofa good life and to exercise significant control over their lives.
Most people are certainly much concerned about the nature ofthe last stage oftheir
lives. Death is today increasingly preceded by a long period of significant physical
and mental decline, due in part to the technological interventions of modern
medicine. For many patients near death, maintaining the quality of one's life,
avoiding great suffering, maintaining one's dignity, and ensuring that others remem-
ber us as we wish them to, become of paramount importance and outweigh merely
extending one's life. Since there is no single, objectively correct answer for everyone,
as to when, if at all, when one is critically or terminally ill, one's life becomes (all
things considered) a burden and unwanted, the great variance among people on this
question makes it especially important that individuals control the manner, circum-
stances, and timing oftheir dying and death.
The other main value that supports euthanasia is individual well-being. It might
seem that protecting patients' well-being conflictswith a person's self-determination
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when that person requests euthanasia. Life itself is commonly taken to be a central
good for individuals. But when a competent patient decides to forgo all further
life-sustaining treatmentorrequests euthanasia, life is no longerconsidered abenefit
by that patient, but has now become a burden. Of course, sometimes there are
conditions, such asclinical depression, thatcall into questionwhetherthe patient has
made a competent choice, either to forgo life-sustaining treatment or to seek
euthanasia, and a determination of incompetence can warrant not honoring the
patient's choice.
I emphasize that the value or right of self-determination of patients does not
entitle them to compel physicians to act contrary to the physician's own moral or
professional values. Physicians are moral and professional agents whose own self-
determination or integrity should be respected as well. If performing euthanasia
becomes legally permissible, but conflicts with a particular physician's reasonable
understanding of his or her moral or professional responsibilities, the care of a
patient who requests euthanasia should be transferred to another. But the ethical
and policy issue is the permissibility of performing euthanasia by those who do not
have moral or professional objections to it.
Opponents ofeuthanasia commonly offer two types ofarguments against euthana-
sia, which they take to outweigh or to override this support of euthanasia. The first
argument is that, in any individual case in which a patient's self-determination and
well-being do support euthanasia, it is nevertheless always ethically wrong or
impermissible. The second argument grants that, in some individual cases, euthana-
sia may not be ethicallywrong, but maintains nonetheless that ethically sound public
and legal policy should neverpermit it. The first argument focuses on features ofany
individual case ofeuthanasia, while the second focuses on a social or legal policythat
would permit euthanasia. I will initially consider the first argument.
THE ARGUMENT THAT EUTHANASIA IS ALWAYS THE DELIBERATE
KILLING OF AN INNOCENT PERSON
The claim that any individual instance of euthanasia is a case ofdeliberate killing
of an innocent person is, with only minor qualifications, correct. Unlike forgoing
life-sustaining treatment, which is commonly understood as allowing to die, euthana-
sia is clearlykilling. Unlike providingmorphine forpain reliefat doseswhere the risk
ofrespiratory depression and an earlier death maybe a foreseenbut unintended side
effect oftreating the patient's pain, in euthanasia the patient's death is deliberate or
intended, even ifin both instances the physician's ultimate end maybe to respect the
patient's wishes. If there is a sound ethical prohibition of all deliberate killing of an
innocent person, euthanasia would be nearly always impermissible, but is such an
ethical prohibition defensible?
In the context ofmedicine, what lends this ethical prohibition plausibility in part is
the belief that nothing in the currently accepted practice of medicine is deliberate
killing. Thus, according to thisview, forgoingoflife-sustaining treatment, whetherby
not starting orbystopping treatment, is allowing thepatient to die, notkilling, and so
is not covered by the ethical prohibition against killing. Common though the view is
that stopping life-sustaining treatment is allowing someone to die, I shall argue that
the belief is confused and mistaken. Typical cases of stopping life-sustaining treat-
ment are killing; they are not allowing to die, though they are cases of ethically
justified killing.
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Why is the common view that stopping life-sustaining treatment is allowing to die
and not killing a mistaken one? Consider the case of a patient, terminally ill with
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) disease, who is completely respirator-depen-
dent, with no hope of ever being weaned from the respirator. The patient is
unquestionably competent but finds her condition intolerable and persistently
requests to be removed from the respirator and allowed to die. Most people would
agree that the patient's physician should respect the patient'swishes and remove her
from the respirator, though this actionwill certainlyresult inthepatient's death. The
common understanding ofwhat the physician does in removing the patient from the
respirator is that the physician thereby allows the patient to die. But is thatviewpoint
correct?
Suppose the patient has a greedy and hostile son, who mistakenly believes both
that his mother will never decide to stop her life-sustaining treatment and that, even
if she did, her physician would not remove her from the respirator. Afraid that his
inheritance will be dissipated by a long and expensive hospitalization, he enters his
mother's room while she is sedated, extubates her, turns off the respirator, and she
dies. Shortly thereafter, the medical staff discovers what he has done and confronts
the son, who replies, "I didn't kill her; I merely allowed her to die. It was her ALS
disease that caused her death." I think this answer would rightly be dismissed as
transparent sophistry-the son went into his mother's room and deliberately killed
her. But, of course, the son performed just the same physical actions, did just the
same thing, that the physician would have done. Ifthat is so, then the physician also
kills the patient when he extubates her and stops the respirator.
I underline immediately that there are important ethical differences betweenwhat
the physician and the greedy son do. First, only the physician acts with the patient's
consent. Second, the physician acts with a good motive-to respect the patient's
wishes and self-determination-whereas the son acts with a bad motive-to protect
his own inheritance. Third, only the physician acts in a social role, in which he is
legally authorized to carry out the patient's wishes to stop treatment. These, and
perhaps other, ethically important differences show that what the physician did was
morally justified, whereas what the son did was morally wrong. What they do not
show, however, is that the son killed, while the physician allowed to die. One can
eitherkill or allowtodiewith orwithout consent, with agood orbadmotive, in ornot
in a social role which legally authorizes one to do so.
Suppose that my argument is mistaken: that stopping life support as well as
euthanasia is killing. Euthanasia, though deliberate killing, still need not, for that
reason, be morally wrong. To see this point ofview, we need to ask: What is it that
makesparadigm casesofwrongful killingwrongful? Oneveryplausible answer isthat
killing denies the victim something that he or she values greatly-continued life or a
future. Moreover, since continued life is necessary for pursuing any of a person's
plans and purposes, killing brings the frustration of all ofthese plans and desires as
well. In anutshell,wrongfulkillingdeprives an individual ofavaluedfuture and ofall
that the person wanted and planned to do in that future.
Anatural expression ofthis account ofthewrongness ofkilling is that people have
a moral right not to be killed [2]. But in this account ofthe wrongness ofkilling, the
right not tobe killed, like other rights, should bewaivable when the individual makes
a competent decision that continued life is no longerwanted or agood, but is instead
worse than no further life at all. In this rights view of the wrongness of killing,
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voluntary euthanasia then does notviolate that right. I turn now to the evaluation of
public policyon euthanasia.
PUBLIC POLICY: WOULD THE BAD CONSEQUENCES OF
EUTHANASIA OUTWEIGH THE GOOD?
The case against euthanasia at the policy level is stronger than that at the level of
evaluation ofindividual cases, though even here I believe the argument is ultimately
unpersuasive, or at best indecisive. There is considerable empirical or factual
disagreement about what would be the consequences of a legal policy permitting
euthanasia in the United States at this time, which is greatly exacerbated by the
highly speculative nature ofmanyofthe feared consequences andbythe general lack
of firm data on the issue. There is also moral or evaluative disagreement about the
relative importance of different good and bad consequences. Despite these difficul-
ties, a preliminary account ofthe probable main good and bad consequences should
help to clarify where better data and/or more moral analysis and argument are
needed, aswell aswhere policy safeguards must be developed.
Potential Good Consequences ofPermittingEuthanasia
What are the likely good consequences ofmaking euthanasia legally permissible?
First, if euthanasia were permitted, it would then be possible to respect the
self-determination ofcompetent patientswhowant it, but now cannot get itbecause
ofitsillegality. We simply do notknowhowmanysuchpatients andpeople there are.
In the Netherlands, where euthanasia is legally permitted, a recent study estimated
that about 2 percent of deaths were from euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide.
No straightforward extrapolation to the United States is possible for many reasons,
but, even with better data, significant moral disagreement would remain about how
much weight or importance should be given to any instance of failure to respect a
person's self-determination in thisway.
A second good consequence of making euthanasia legally permissible benefits a
much larger group. Polls of Americans have shown that a majority of the public
believes that people should have a right to obtain euthanasia if they want it [3]. No
doubt thevastmajorityofthosewho supportthis right to euthanasiawill neverinfact
come to want it for themselves, but making euthanasia legally permissible would
reassure the many who support euthanasia that, if they ever should want it, they
would be able to obtain it. The legalization ofeuthanasia can be thought ofas a kind
of insurance policy that one will not be forced to endure a protracted dying process
that one has come to find burdensome and unwanted, should there be no life-
sustaining treatment to forgo.
A third good consequence of the legalization of euthanasia concerns patients
whose lives,while they are dying, are filledwith severe andunrelievable pain, and for
whom euthanasia is the only release from their otherwise prolonged suffering and
agony. This argument from mercy has always been the strongest argument for
euthanasia in those cases towhich it applies [4]. But howoften are patients forced to
undergo untreatable agony which only euthanasia could relieve? It is crucial to
distinguish those patients whose pain could be adequately relieved with modem
methods ofpain control, though in fact it is not, from those whose pain is relievable
onlyby death [5].
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Specialists in pain control-for example, in terminally ill cancer patients-argue
that there are very few patients whose pain could not be adequately controlled,
though sometimes at the cost of so sedating them that they are effectively unable to
interact with other people or their environment. Thus, the argument from mercy in
cases of physical pain can probably be met in most cases by providing adequate
measures of pain relief, short of euthanasia. This goal should be a high priority,
whatever our legal policy on euthanasia. Dying patients often undergo substantial
psychological suffering that is not fully or even principally the result ofphysical pain
[6]. If the argument from mercy is extended to patients experiencing great and
unrelievable psychological suffering, the numbers of patients to which it applies is
much greater.
One last good consequence that proponents of legalizing euthanasia cite is that,
once a decision "for death" has been made, it is often more humane to end life
quickly and peacefully, as can be done by euthanasia, when that end is what the
patient wants. Such a death will often be seen as a better death than a more
prolonged one inwhich the patient maybe robbed ofhis or her dignity.
Some opponents of euthanasia challenge these good consequences of permitting
euthanasia, but most opponents of euthanasia cite a number of bad consequences
that permitting euthanasiawould orcould produce.
PotentialBad Consequences ofPermittingEuthanasia
I shall first consider an argument specifically against physicians performing
euthanasia. The performance of euthanasia by physicians, it is said, would be
incompatible with their fundamental moral and professional commitment as healers
to care for patients and to protect life. Ifeuthanasia by physicians became common,
this sanction would weaken patients' trust in their physicians, as patients came to
fear that a medication was intended not to treat or cure, but instead to kill. This
position was forcefully stated in a paper by four prominent physicians and bioethi-
cists:
The very soul ofmedicine is on trial .... This issue touches medicine at its
moral center; ifthismoral center collapses, ifphysicians become killers or are
even licensed to kill, the profession-and, therewith, each physician-will
never again be worthy of trust and respect as healer and comforter and
protector oflife in all its frailty.
These authors go on to make clear that, while they oppose permitting anyone to
perform euthanasia, their special concern iswith physicians doing so:
We call on fellow physicians to say that they will not deliberately kill. We
must also say to each ofour fellow physicians that we will not tolerate killing
ofpatients and that we shall take disciplinary action against doctorswho kill.
And we must say to the broader community that if it insists on tolerating or
legalizing active euthanasia, it will have to find nonphysicians to do its killing
[7].
How persuasive is this claim that permitting physicians to kill would undermine
thevery "moral center" ofmedicine? One point is that patients should not fear, as a
consequence of voluntary active euthanasia becoming permissible, that their physi-
cians will substitute a lethal injection for what patients want and believe is part of
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their care. If active euthanasia is trulyvoluntary, then no patient should fear getting
it without his or her ownvoluntary request. Patients' fear oflosing control over their
care and the circumstances of their dying should be lessened, not strengthened, if
euthanasia were permitted, and this policy should strengthen trust in their physi-
cians.
Might these authors, nevertheless, be correct that, if physicians should become
killers, the moral center of medicine would collapse? This question raises what, at
the deepest level, should be the guiding aims ofmedicine, a question that obviously
cannot be fully explored here. I believe that the two values of respecting patients'
self-determination and promoting their well-being should guide physicians' actions
as healers, comforters, and protectors of their patients' lives and should be at the
"moral center" of medicine. These two values support physicians' performance of
euthanasia when their patients make competent requests for it. The proper aims of
medicine and the limits on physicians' powerwill surelybe one ofthe central themes
in the continuing debate about euthanasia.
A second possible bad consequence ofpermitting euthanasia is the weakening of
society's commitment to provide optimal care for dyingpatients. We live at a time in
which the control ofhealth care costs hasbecome, and is likely to continue to be, the
dominant focus of health care policy. If euthanasia is regarded as a cheaper
alternative to adequate care and treatment, thenpressure mayweaken to ensure that
the quality of life of dying patients is appropriately maximized by providing some-
times costly support and other services. Particularly ifour society comes to embrace
deeper and more explicit rationing of health care, frail, elderly, and dying patients
will be in a poor position to be strong and effective advocates for their own health
care and other needs.
Here are two reasonsforskepticism aboutthis argument. Thefirst isthatthis same
worrycould have been directed at recognizing patients' or surrogates' rights to forgo
life-sustaining treatment. Andyet, there isnopersuasive evidencethatthegainingby
patients and surrogates of rights to forgo life-sustaining treatment caused a serious
erosion in the quality ofcare ofdyingpatients from either a decreasedwillingness of
payers to fund that care or a decreased commitment of professionals or families to
provide it. The second reason for skepticism about this worry is that because only a
verysmallproportion ofdeathswould occurfromeuthanasia ifitwerepermitted, the
vast majority of critically ill and dying patients will still have to be cared for by
physicians, families, and others. Permitting euthanasia should not diminish people's
commitment and concern to maintain and improve the care ofthese patients.
The final potential bad consequence oflegalizing euthanasia is the central concern
of many opponents of euthanasia and, I believe, is the most serious objection to a
legal policy permitting euthanasia. According to this "slippery slope" worry, al-
though active euthanasia maybe morallypermissible in cases inwhich it is unequivo-
cally voluntary and the patient finds his or her condition unbearable, a legal policy
permitting euthanasia would inevitably lead to active euthanasiabeingperformed in
manyother cases inwhich itwouldbe morallywrong. In order to prevent those other
wrongful cases of euthanasia, we should not permit even morally justified perfor-
mance ofit.
"Slippery slope" arguments of this form are problematic and difficult to evaluate
[8]. In this argument's most extreme form, permitting euthanasia is the first and
fateful step down the slippery slope to Nazism, a slope that, once we are on, we will
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be unable to get off. Now it cannot be denied that it is possible that permitting
euthanasia could have these fateful consequences, but that cannot be enough to
warrant prohibiting an otherwise justified practice of euthanasia. A similarpossible
"slippery slope" worry could have been raised over securing competent patients'
rights to decide about life support, but recent history shows such a "slippery slope"
worry would have been unfounded. How likely and widespread would be the abuses
and unwarranted extensions of permitting euthanasia? Opponents of euthanasia on
"slippery slope" grounds have not provided the data or evidence necessary to turn
their speculative concerns into well-grounded likelihoods. The character and likeli-
hood of abuses of a legal policy permitting euthanasia depend in significant part on
the procedures put in place to protect against them, though there is not space to
detail those here. It is possible to reduce substantially, though not to eliminate, the
potential for abuse of a policy permitting euthanasia. Any legalization of euthanasia
should only be enacted with a well-considered set ofprocedural safeguards, together
with an ongoing process of evaluation of the use of euthanasia.
While I believe necessary distinctions can be made, both in principle and in
practice, to largely limit "slippery slope" worries, one legitimate "slippery slope"
concern should be acknowledged. There is reason to expect that legalization of
voluntary euthanasia might soon be followed by pressure for the legalization ofsome
non-voluntary euthanasia of incompetent patients unable to express their own
wishes. Respecting an individual's self-determination and recognizing that continued
life is not always a good for someone can support not only voluntary euthanasia, but
some non-voluntary euthanasia as well. Recent historywith life-sustaining treatment
is instructive. There, the right of competent patients has been extended to incompe-
tent patients and exercised by a surrogate, who is to decide as the patient would have
decided in the circumstances if competent [9]. It has been plausibly held to be
unreasonable to continue life-sustaining treatment that the patient would not have
wanted just because the patient now lacks the capacity to tell us so. The very same
logic that has extended the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment from a competent
patient to the surrogate of an incompetent patient (acting with or without a formal
advance directive from the patient) may well do the same in the case of active
euthanasia.
This potential for legalization of voluntary euthanasia which in time could be
extended to non-voluntary active euthanasia, with surrogates acting for incompetent
patients, is the main, legitimate "slippery slope" worry about permitting euthanasia.
Even if this practice is a likely outcome, however, its ethical evaluation is more
complex than many opponents of euthanasia allow. Just as in the case of surrogates'
decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment for incompetent patients, so also surro-
gates' decisions for non-voluntary euthanasia for incompetent persons would often
accurately reflect what the incompetent person would have wanted and would deny
that person nothing that he or she would have considered a good. If non-voluntary
active euthanasia were permitted, however, the potential for misuse and abuse would
unquestionably be greater.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON THE ROLE OF PHYSICIANS IN
EUTHANASIA
Ifeuthanasia is made legally permissible, should physicians take part in it? Should
only physicians be permitted to perform it, as is the case in the Netherlands? In
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discussing above the objection that euthanasia is incompatible with medicine's
commitment to curing, caring for, and comforting patients, I argued that it is not
incompatible with a proper understanding ofthe aims ofmedicine, and so need not
undermine patients' trust in their physicians. If so, then physicians probably should
not be prohibited, either by law or by professional norms, from taking part in legally
permissible euthanasia. Most physicians in the Netherlands appear not to consider
euthanasia to be incompatiblewith their professional commitments.
There are also at least two reasons for restricting any legal permission to perform
euthanasia only to physicians. First, physicians would inevitably be involved in some
ofthe importantprocedural safeguards necessary to adefensible practice ofeuthana-
sia, such as ensuring thatpatients arewell-informed about theircondition, prognosis,
and possible treatments, and ensuring that all reasonable means have been taken to
improve patients' quality of life. Second, and probably more important, one neces-
saryprotection against abuse ofany legalization ofeuthanasia is to limitwho is given
the authority to perform euthanasia, so that they can be held accountable for their
exercise of that authority. That authority could quite reasonably be limited to
physicians, whose training and professional norms give some assurance that they
would perform euthanasia responsibly.
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